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Abstract This study ﬁnds evidence of a large premium in Youngtown
Arizona house prices that persisted over time and could be
attributed to the town’s age-restricted status. Age restrictions
may act as a signal that the community provides facilities and
services that meet the needs of the senior population and the
assurance that those facilities and services will be available in
the future. This assurance reduces uncertainty for future owners
and it is the reduced uncertainty that is capitalized into house
prices. The loss of the age restriction resulted in the elimination
of the premium over approximately twelve to eighteen months.
Introduction
While the majority of seniors prefer mixed communities, a signiﬁcant percentage
of them have chosen to live in age-restricted projects or communities. Data from
the American Housing Survey indicate that approximately 27% of households with
one or more occupants age 55 or older live in age-restricted communities, which
represents almost 10% of total occupied units.1 A comparable percentage is
reported in Housing America’s Seniors but it is based on those age 60 or older.2
The same report cites Census Bureau projections that the elderly population,
deﬁned as those 65 years of age or older, is expected to double between 2000
and 2030. With the aging population in the United States, issues associated with
housing for the elderly will become increasingly important to policymakers and
create opportunities for the private sector. The housing needs of seniors range
from active adult communities for independent living to projects that provide
specialized care to the frail elderly. A large segment of the senior market is
represented by those able to maintain an independent lifestyle and it is those
households who are the focus of this research.
While a relatively small percentage of seniors choose age-restricted housing, the
number of age-restricted projects or communities is likely to increase simply
because of changing demographics. For this reason it is important to study age-
restricted housing to gain a better understanding of why some seniors are attracted
to it. There is evidence that age-restricted housing sells at a premium to
comparable but non-age-restricted units but those studies made a limited effort to256  Guntermann and Thomas
explain the premiums and they used condominium (Allen, 1997) and manufactured
housing data (Guntermann and Moon, 2002). This will be the ﬁrst study to use
single-family data, which represents a much larger segment of the housing market,
to examine age restrictions and house prices. In addition to testing for price effects,
this paper will discuss possible reasons why some seniors select age-restricted
housing and provide an interpretation of the empirical results that is consistent
with a theoretical model on deed restrictions and uncertainty developed by Hughes
and Turnbull (1996).
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. The ﬁrst is to examine the long-term
relationship between age restrictions and house prices in a local housing market.
The beneﬁts to seniors of being able to live with those who are at a similar stage
in the lifecycle and share similar preferences comes at the cost of excluding
younger households from a portion of the market. If a price premium were to be
detected in an age-restricted community, this would be evidence that age
restrictions offer something of lasting value to seniors. Those beneﬁts theoretically
could be compared to the costs, if any, that are imposed on excluded households.
A regression model is used to test whether such a long-term price effect can be
detected. The second purpose is to examine the short-term response of the market
to the loss of age-restricted status and efforts to reinstate it. A second regression
model is estimated with time-related dummy variables to test for short-term price
effects.
The paper is organized as follows. The economics of age restrictions is presented
along with a discussion of previous empirical research in this area. The next
section provides background information on Youngtown Arizona and events
related to the loss of its age restriction. The methodology and data used in the
empirical analysis are explained after that. Finally, the paper presents the results
and interpretations along with concluding comments.
 Age Restriction
Age restriction can be viewed as one form of housing discrimination because
households that cannot satisfy the minimum age requirement are prohibited from
buying into an age-restricted area. The traditional criteria in either the private
(deed restrictions) or public form (overlay zoning) is that at least one person in a
household must be 55 years of age or older and those younger than a certain age
(typically 16–18 years) may not reside in the unit more than a certain number of
days per year. Some age-restricted projects provide relatively few amenities
oriented to seniors but most projects have a fairly extensive array of facilities or
services for the elderly.
The motivation behind those seniors who select age-restricted housing is
undoubtedly complex. The elderly face special challenges and are more likely to
ﬁnd support groups in age-restricted projects or communities because theirLoss of Age-Restricted and Property Values  257
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neighbors are in a similar situation. Recreation centers become an important focal
point for social activities. Transportation for shopping and medical care often is
available, either formally or informally. Familiarity with neighbors and their daily
routine allows the elderly to keep track of each other. Because safety is a major
concern, residents are more aware when strangers are in the neighborhood than
in mixed-age neighborhoods where one or both adults are likely to work and be
less familiar to their neighbors.
There may also be an economic component to the decision to reside in an age-
restricted project. Yards and homes tend to be well maintained in age-restricted
subdivisions because home equities are likely to represent a signiﬁcant portion of
household wealth (Guntermann, 2002). Maintaining that wealth for later stages in
the lifecycle that may involve institutional care is a priority, especially for lower
and moderate-income households.3 To the extent that some seniors believe that
property values will be maintained, if not enhanced, compared to similar structures
in non age-restricted communities, they may be attracted to such areas partly for
ﬁnancial reasons.
While many of the attributes associated with age-restricted projects are equally
valued by both elderly and other households, seniors had the political inﬂuence
to gain an exemption from Title VII of the Fair Housing Act, as amended in 1988.
The 1988 Act required the Department of Housing and Urban Development to
publish regulations deﬁning and listing the ‘‘signiﬁcant facilities and services’’
that projects had to provide before they could be granted an exemption from Title
VII. Various iterations of proposed regulations left the legal status of age
restrictions unclear.4 The Housing for Older Persons Act of 1995 removed any
uncertainty about the legality of age restrictions at the federal level because it
states that a project can be age-restricted essentially by electing age-restricted
status and ﬁling the necessary paperwork with the Federal Housing
Administration. The 1995 Act also had the effect of removing any doubt about
the legality of local and county age restriction ordinances. Under the 1995 Act,
one or more persons who are 55 or older must occupy at least 80% of the housing
units before a project can be approved as age-restricted. Once a project is granted
age-restricted status, subsequent purchasers must satisfy the age requirement. In
theory, these projects ultimately could become exclusively age-restricted.
Allen (1997) was the ﬁrst to present empirical evidence of an age-related price
effect in the Broward County, Florida condominium market. He used data from
1995 to 1996 for age-restricted and comparable but non-age-restricted projects
and found a positive price effect (14%) in the age-restricted projects. However,
the short-term nature of his database leaves open the possibility that his results
were caused by a temporary imbalance in the housing market. His interpretation
of the results is that age restriction ‘‘results in a net increase in total demand’’ for
the housing units.5
Guntermann and Moon (2002) discuss a model by Hughes and Turnbull (1996)
that can be extended to age restrictions and provides a theoretical explanation for258  Guntermann and Thomas
why property values might reﬂect an age restriction premium. According to
Hughes and Turnbull, private covenants can reduce uncertainty about future
negative externalities and, hence, the reduced uncertainty can be capitalized into
house prices. An age restriction is somewhat different from most private covenants
because it applies to the occupants of the property rather than in some way
restricting the use of the property. However, to the extent that some elderly are
attracted to age-restricted projects or communities because of the facilities and
services that they offer, an age restriction can help to ensure that future owners
will have similar preferences. The presence of non-elderly households, whose
interests often differ from the elderly, reduces the likelihood that various age-
restricted attributes would continue to be provided or be provided at the same
level. In this sense, the presence of non-elderly households would represent a
negative externality. Eliminating the externality through an age restriction would
reduce uncertainty about the future character of the project and this reduced
uncertainty could be capitalized into property values.
Guntermann and Moon published evidence in support of the Hughes and Turnbull
uncertainty thesis in 2002. Their study used manufactured housing data from
Mesa, Arizona, and found a price premium in age-restricted subdivisions for most
years from 1984 through 2000, after controlling for quality differences in
amenities and housing unit characteristics across subdivisions. The premium
ranged from 10% to 32% and averaged 17% for those years that showed
statistically signiﬁcant premiums.6 Since the premium could be detected for many
years and under different market conditions, this ﬁnding was strong evidence that
an age restriction, which is the label for senior-oriented facilities and service, has
considerable value. One interpretation of those results is that age-restricted status
is a valuable component of the housing bundle such as physical attributes or
proximity to certain amenities. A similar ﬁnding of an age restriction premium
using single-family housing data would be potentially more important since it
would apply to the largest segment of the housing market.
There is also empirical evidence that governmental interference with the housing
market can have unintended consequences. In an attempt to ensure an adequate
supply of housing for seniors, a suburban area of San Diego required that a
minimum percentage of houses in new subdivisions had to be reserved for the
elderly. Do and Grudnitski (1997) presented evidence of negative price effects in
the affected area of San Diego from 1990 to 1993 because of the oversupply of
restricted housing that resulted from the law, apparently because the government
was unresponsive to changed market conditions.
 Youngtown
The ﬁrst master-planned retirement community in the nation is Youngtown
Arizona, which dates to 1954. It occupies 320 acres in the northwestern portion
of the Phoenix metropolitan area next to Sun City and has approximately 2,700Loss of Age-Restricted and Property Values  259
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residents. The original intent of the developer was to create a town for ‘‘seniors
only.’’ However, legal provisions to ensure adult-only status were not included in
the deed restrictions nor were they part of the city charter when Youngtown was
incorporated. Municipalities were given the authority to ‘‘... establish age-speciﬁc
community zoning districts ...’’ in 1971 [A.R.S. 9-462.01(A) (11)]. In 1986,
Youngtown amended its zoning ordinance to provide for 55 ‘‘age-speciﬁc’’
Overlay Zoning Districts (Youngtown, Section 4-3-101(c) 2), which required that
at least one person per dwelling unit must be 50 years of age or older and
prohibited permanent occupancy by anyone younger than 18 years of age for more
than 90 days per year. In 1989, the minimum age was raised to 55.
The 1986 ordinance was not challenged until December 1996 when the town
council turned down a request to extend the length of time a 16 year old would
be allowed to live with his grandparents. That action immediately led to an
investigation into the Youngtown ordinance by the Arizona Attorney General’s
ofﬁce. The investigation concluded in October 1997 that Youngtown had not
complied with the county enabling statutes when it created the overlay zoning
districts. Speciﬁcally, Youngtown did not have consent from all property owners
and several of the homes were rented to families with minor children before the
ordinance was adopted. This made the ordinance ‘‘... void since inception’’ and
unenforceable.7 As part of the settlement, Youngtown agreed to repeal its age
restriction ordinance, which occurred in May 1998.
Even after the repeal, strong sentiment remained in Youngtown favoring the age
restriction. By complying with federal and state laws, subdivisions or entire
communities can elect age-restricted status at any time and a grass-roots effort
was initiated to make Youngtown age-restricted. In October 1998, the town council
passed a new ordinance and sent it to state and federal agencies for review and
approval. The new ordinance would have created age-restricted districts containing
eight or more contiguous lots. Petition drives and other actions creating such
districts began immediately after passage of the ordinance and several petitions
were ﬁled with the town council in February 1999. Maps of the proposed districts
were sent to the city attorney as well as to federal and state agencies for
preliminary review. All three reviews were negative because of the gerrymandered,
non-contiguous nature of the proposed districts. The Youngtown Council rejected
the proposed districts in May 1999, which effectively ended all organized efforts
to establish an age restriction in Youngtown. The dates associated with these
various actions are summarized in Exhibit 1, where the more important dates have
been assigned event numbers.
 Methodology and Data
The empirical analysis estimates two models that examine both long- and short-
term issues related to age restriction. The long-term presence or absence of age-
related effects in house prices can be determined using dummy variables in models260  Guntermann and Thomas
Exhibit 1  Notable Dates Associated with the Loss of Age-Restricted Status in Youngtown Arizona
Date Action Event
December 1996 Town Council votes to deny a request to
extend the time a teenager may live with
grandparents
January 1997 Arizona Attorney General’s ofﬁce announces it
will investigate age restriction in Youngtown
October 1997 Attorney General rules that the age restriction
ordinance in Youngtown is invalid and
unenforceable
1
April 1998 Town Council agrees to rescind its age
restriction ordinance
May 1998 Age restriction ordinance is repealed
October 1998 Town Council approves a new age restriction
ordinance with districts of eight or more
houses and sends it to the state and federal
governments for approval
February 1999 Petitions to create age-restricted districts are
ﬁled with the Town Council and forwarded to
federal and state authorities for review
2
May 1999 Proposed districts are rejected by the state and
federal governments and the town council
3
Source: Ofﬁce of the Arizona Attorney General; Youngtown city attorney and The Arizona
Republic, various issues.
estimated with pooled cross-sectional data covering multi-year periods. Short-term
actions associated with changes in age-restricted status can be associated with
speciﬁc points in time. For this reason, consideration was given to using ‘‘Event’’
methodology from ﬁnance to test the effects of those actions on house prices.
However, event methodology regresses one or more variables representing the
event of interest against the market to see if an abnormal return can be detected.
It is not practical to use event methodology in this case, so dummy variables
associated with short periods of time will be used to test hypotheses in the
‘‘Event’’ model. Price is the dependent variable in a standard hedonic model and
either Youngtown dummy variables (long-term) or interaction variables (short-
term) tied to one or more events of interest are included in the respective models.
The models are estimated using data from Youngtown, El Mirage, which is to the
west, and selected parts of Sun City and Peoria. These areas are both comparable
and superior to Youngtown in important demographic measures and include both
age-restricted and non-age-restricted areas (Exhibit 2). House values and median






























































Exhibit 2  Demographic Data for Youngtown and Selected Census Tracts in Comparison Cities




Income ($) Median Age
Median House
Value ($) Age Restricted
Youngtown 716.00 2,351 1,619 15,929 66.8 44,700 Yes
El Mirage 609.00 4,652 1,279 18,721 23.7 43,700 No
Sun City 717.00 3,697 2,820 23,004 74.3 56,700 Yes
718.01 4,818 3,421 20,813 74.2 60,100
718.02 3,613 2,584 21,779 74.0 64,200
Peoria 719.06 3,568 1,251 33,602 28.3 77,900 No
719.08 3,856 1,831 21,360 30.0 64,700
719.09 1,370 824 20,362 63.2 50,000
927.07 3,032 1,782 31,750 44.7 77,400
927.09 2,952 977 38,243 26.9 79,200
Source: 1990 Census of Population and Housing, Population and Housing characteristics for Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas, Phoenix, AZ MSA,
Tables 1, 9, and 19, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census.262  Guntermann and Thomas
Mirage is not age-restricted and the median age of its residents is much younger
than Youngtown. The older parts of Sun City, immediately east of Youngtown,
have somewhat higher median household incomes and considerably higher
housing values than are found in Youngtown. In contrast to Youngtown, Sun City
is much larger and age-related covenants were included in its CC&Rs when
development began in the early 1960s. Hence, both El Mirage and Sun City can
serve as control areas for the events that affected Youngtown. The portions of
Peoria used in this study are to the south and east of Youngtown and include
census tracts with a range of median ages, household incomes and housing values.
No part of Peoria is age-restricted.
The ﬁrst empirical question is whether an age restriction premium can be detected
in a traditional, single-family housing market that has been age-restricted since its
inception. If such a premium can be measured, that would suggest that the
facilities and services associated with an age restriction are valuable parts of the
housing bundle. Model 1 will test for a long-term price effect using data from
Youngtown and El Mirage. If such a premium can be measured, it would follow
that the loss of the age restriction should lead to the elimination of much, if not
all, of the premium over time. To test for both the presence and absence of an
age restriction premium at different times, Model 1 will be estimated using data
for three different time periods.
A standard set of house characteristics variables are included in Model 1, along
with the Youngtown dummy variable and ‘‘Permits’’ and ‘‘All Cash’’ variables.
Exhibit 3 contains deﬁnitions for all variables used in both models. Beginning in
1999, El Mirage began to develop rapidly (Exhibit 4). A Permits variable is
included to control for factors associated with growth that might not be reﬂected
in the property characteristics variables. In addition, a dummy variable, All Cash,
was included to test if there is a discount associated with a 100% equity purchase.
Real estate contracts typically are conditional on the purchaser qualifying for
mortgage ﬁnancing. As part of the loan package, an appraisal also is required to
establish market value. The delays and uncertainty associated with the approval
process give cash purchasers an advantage that might be reﬂected in a lower
purchase price vis-a `-vis purchasers using debt ﬁnancing. In addition, ‘‘all cash’’
purchases are more likely to occur with seniors, as can be seen in the data for
Sun City and Youngtown in Exhibit 5, which contains the descriptive statistics for
the entire database and each individual city. Model 1 is estimated in log-linear
form so that the coefﬁcients can be interpreted as elasticities or percentages, which
is intuitively appealing.
ln {price}  ln {time}  ln {size}  ln {age}
 ln {baths}  carport  garage  allcash
 extwall  permits  youngtown. (1)Loss of Age-Restricted and Property Values  263
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Exhibit 3  Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Time The time, in months, from January 1, 1992 to the date of sale
Size The size, in square feet, of the house
Age The age, in years, of the house
Baths The number of bathrooms
Carport A dummy variable equal to 1 if the house has a carport and 0 otherwise
Garage A dummy variable equal to 1 if the house has a garage and 0 otherwise
All Cash A dummy variable equal to 1 if the purchase was made in cash only and 0
otherwise
Ext Wall A dummy variable equal to 0 if the house is made from frame or block and
1 otherwise
Permits The number of new house construction permits issued in the zip code of the
house during the quarter in which the transaction took place
Youngtown A dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction was within Youngtown and
0 otherwise
El Mirage A dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction was within El Mirage and 0
otherwise
Sun City A dummy variable equal to 1 if the transaction was within Sun City and 0
otherwise
E1YTE3SC Event dummy variables
The loss of the age restriction does not mean that the facilities and services
associated with it would instantly be eliminated but rather that the quality of those
services and their future availability would be in question. For this reason, the
second empirical issue involves the short-term market response to the loss of the
age restriction and efforts to reinstate it. Model 2 investigates this short-term
adjustment process using several dummy variables associated with various events
and data for all four cities. Dummy variables are also included for Youngtown,
El Mirage and Sun City based on variations in household income, median age
and other factors that were not identiﬁed in Exhibit 2 but that could affect price.
Of primary interest are the interaction variables created for three of the events in
Exhibit 1 and the city dummy variables. For example, E1YT is the variable
associated with Event 1 for Youngtown. The same convention is used to create
the other interaction variables. Peoria is omitted both as a city dummy variable
and also as the interaction variable. Equation 2 is also estimated in log-linear form























Exhibit 4  Housing Permits, Sales and Median Price Western Suburbs, Phoenix Metropolitan Area
City 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
El Mirage
Permits 11 7 22 10 878 1,894 2,154
Sales 16 17 31 31 380 1,306 1,789
Price ($) 40,750 40,087 55,200 49,000 83,416 93,006 106,351
Peoria
Permits 1,325 1,722 1,931 3,290 2,794 2,726 1,750
Sales 2,229 3,183 3,243 5,106 4,941 5,097 5,129
Price ($) 100,351 107,288 110,890 114,993 123,006 134,355 145,000
Sun City
Permits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sales 1,153 1,233 1,269 1,430 1,515 1,320 1,490
Price ($) 88,000 90,000 94,500 98,000 102,000 102,500 100,000
Youngtown
Permits 7 4 1 0 0 1 0
Sales 99 101 90 90 135 144 136
Price ($) 45,000 47,500 55,000 59,400 65,000 71,900 80,489






























































Exhibit 5  Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: All Data
Price 8,049 77,858 25,529 20,000 259,000
Size 8,049 1,332 330 519 3,316
Baths 8,049 1.79 0.58 1 4.7
Time 8,049 63.50 34.38 1 118
Age 8,049 23.87 13.10 1 51
Carport 8,049 0.52 0.50 0 1
Garage 8,049 0.44 0.50 0 1
All Cash 8,049 0.23 0.42 0 1
Permits 8,049 37.23 110.00 0 859
Panel B: Youngtown
Price 885 57,221 19,050 20,000 175,000
Size 885 1,057 267 702 3,183
Baths 885 1.29 0.44 1 2.67
Time 885 64.39 34.37 1 118
Age 885 36.85 7.48 1 46
Carport 885 0.71 0.45 0 1
Garage 885 0.15 0.35 0 1
All Cash 885 0.25 0.43 0 1
Permits 885 1.63 1.74 0 5
Panel C: El Mirage
Price 360 57,456 23,836 20,000 154,525
Size 360 1,176 319.47 519 3,086
Baths 360 1.38 0.49 1 3.33
Time 360 74.53 33.83 2 118
Age 360 25.29 15.31 0 51
Carport 360 0.46 0.50 0 1
Garage 360 0.14 0.35 0 1
All Cash 360 0.12 0.33 0 1























Exhibit 5  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel D: Sun City
Price 3,808 72,514 21,795 20,000 259,000
Size 3,808 1,321 316 891 3,316
Baths 3,808 1.64 0.53 1 4.67
Time 3,808 57.08 34.20 1 118
Age 3,808 31.67 5.85 9 42
Carport 3,808 0.77 0.42 0 1
Garage 3,808 0.22 0.42 0 1
All Cash 3,808 0.37 0.48 0 1
Permits 3,808 0.45 0.93 0 3
Panel E: Peoria
Price 2,996 93,192 22,915 20,000 197,500
Size 2,996 1,448 307 525 2,891
Baths 2,996 2.19 0.43 1 4.00
Time 2,996 70.09 33.05 1 118
Age 2,996 9.96 7.24 1 50
Carport 2,996 0.16 0.36 0 1
Garage 2,996 0.83 0.38 0 1
All Cash 2,996 0.06 0.24 0 1
Permits 2,996 67.23 85.11 0 480
Note: A variable is included in the regression model for exterior wall (EXTWALL). The dominant materials are either frame or block, which were not
statistically signiﬁcant in the model. The included variable is deﬁned as other, unspeciﬁed wall types in the assessor’s data. Its descriptive statistics have no
clear interpretation so are omitted.Loss of Age-Restricted and Property Values  267
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ln {price}  ln {time}  ln {size}  ln {age}
 ln {baths}  carport  garage
 allcash  extwall  permits  youngtown
 elmirage  suncity  E1YT  E1EM
 E1SC  E2TY  E2EM  E2SC
 E3YT  E3EM  E3SC. (2)
The three events tested in Equation 2 are those most likely to be associated with
short-term price effects in the Youngtown market. While the December 1996 or
January 1997 actions are noteworthy, at those times there was virtually no concern
on the part of property owners or purchasers that Youngtown’s age restriction
ordinance was invalid. However, the October 1997 ruling by the attorney general’s
ofﬁce was a great shock to Youngtown residents, a concern to seniors in other
age-restricted projects and a major news story in the Phoenix metropolitan area.
Since the attorney general’s ruling was completely unanticipated, the E1YT
variable would be expected to have a negative sign.
Similarly, the emotion associated with an age restriction in Youngtown suggests
that the subsequent efforts to implement a new ordinance might be reﬂected in
house prices because residents pressured the town council for a new ordinance
and initiated the petition drive to implement it. In October 1998, the town council
approved a new age restriction ordinance allowing for districts with eight or more
houses. However, the ordinance could not go into effect until the state and federal
governments had approved it. A more signiﬁcant event occurred in February 1999
when petitions for the proposed districts were ﬁled with the town council,
signaling the start of the legal process to create new districts. However, because
the ordinance and proposed districts had to be approved, the uncertainty that was
associated with the effort to restore the age restriction makes it hard to anticipate
whether this event variable would be signiﬁcant or what sign to expect. The Event
2 variable is included in Model 2 simply because age restriction was such an
emotional issue in Youngtown. In May 1999, the proposed districts were reviewed
negatively and the town council rejected them, effectively ending all efforts to
implement age restrictions in Youngtown. Hence, the coefﬁcient for Event 3 would
be expected to have a negative sign.
The date associated with each transaction in the database is the recording date
and not the contract date. Ideally, event variables used in real estate studies would
test for price effects related to contract dates because the use of recording dates
introduces uncertainty into the speciﬁcation of the event variable. In most cases,
closings occur during the month the contract is signed or the following month.
However, ﬁnancing or other delays (sale of another house) can lengthen the
closing process. In addition, if the housing market is active, the actual recording268  Guntermann and Thomas
of the deed may not occur for several additional weeks or longer. Since the length
of the recording process is variable, it is difﬁcult to associate speciﬁc event dates
with a priori time periods over which price effects, if any, might be measured.
After preliminary testing, it was determined that four month event periods captured
any price effects associated with speciﬁc event dates. This appears to be reasonable
given the normal lag and variability in the contract-to-closing process. Hence, the
duration of each event variable is four months, based on recording dates, and
begins with the event month.
Transaction data were gathered for Youngtown and its surrounding area.
Speciﬁcally, 8,572 single-family house transactions from the ten census tracts in
Exhibit 2 were gathered from January 1992 through February 2003. Marketron,
Inc., which provides data to various clients, begins with transactions data gathered
by the assessor’s ofﬁce. Each sale contains a fairly comprehensive set of property
characteristics, including the month and year when the sale was recorded, size,
year built, baths, exterior wall construction and garages and carports. In addition
to verifying the assessor’s data using its own database, Marketron, Inc. adds
additional property and ﬁnancing information associated with each transaction.
The assessor’s data included a ﬁeld for lot size but this information was missing
for most observations. The zoning classiﬁcation, which could have been used as
a proxy for lot size, also was unavailable so a land variable could not be included
in the model.8 To minimize the possibility that manufactured housing sales are
inadvertently part of the database, transactions at prices below $20,000 are not
included in the database.
 Results
The results for both models are presented in Exhibit 6. Model 1A was estimated
to determine if an age restriction premium was reﬂected in house prices prior to
the loss of the age restriction. For this test, data were used from January 1992
through December 1995, which is prior to the controversy that led to the loss
of the age restriction. The results for Model 1A ﬁnd evidence of a premium in
the single-family housing market, a premium that is both statistically and
economically signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient on the Youngtown dummy variable in
Model 1A (0.164) is both positive and statistically signiﬁcant. It is interpreted as
the age restriction premium relative to the control city, El Mirage, and works out
to almost 18% (e.164 – 1). This is consistent with the premium found by Allen
(14%) for Florida condominium projects using short-term data and by Guntermann
and Moon (17%) using long-term (1983–2000) manufactured housing data in
Arizona.
It is apparent that age restrictions are reﬂected in house prices after controlling
for property characteristics and other differences across these two communities
and that the premium can be quite large. The fact that the premium persists for






























































Exhibit 6  Regression Results
Age Restriction Model (1) Event Model (2)
AB C
Variable Jan. 1992–Dec. 1996 April 2000–Feb. 2003 Oct. 2000–Feb. 2003 Jan. 1992–Oct. 2001
Intercept 7.115 8.203 15.494 6.570
(16.9) (4.2) (4.2) (81.5)
Lntime 0.098 0.012 1.407 0.145
(8.3) (0.0) (1.9) (64.1)
Lnsize 0.410 0.404 0.326 0.565
(7.1) (5.0) (2.8) (47.1)
Lnage 0.021 0.038 0.031 0.061
(0.7) (1.4) (0.9) (15.7)
Lnbaths 0.197 0.086 0.075 0.092
(5.1) (1.3) (0.9) (10.8)
Carport 0.016 0.033 0.038 0.053
(0.6) (0.8) (0.7) (4.9)
Garage 0.102 0.203 0.155 0.141
(2.5) (3.0) (1.6) (12.3)
All Cash 0.077 0.331 0.356 0.048
(3.7) (6.4) (4.5) (9.9)
Ext Wall 0.038 0.009 0.020 0.010
(3.1) (0.6) (1.1) (4.4)
Permits 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.0) (0.1) (0.8) (3.4)
Youngtown 0.164 0.136 0.031 0.071

























Exhibit 6  (continued)
Regression Results
Age Restriction Model (1) Event Model (2)
AB C





















Observations 522 183 93 8,049
Adjusted R2 0.44 0.53 0.60 0.78
F-Statistic 41.36 21.48 12.30 933.50
Notes: The dependent variable is Log of Price. t-ratios are in parentheses.Loss of Age-Restricted and Property Values  271
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characteristics or attributes. While only some seniors desire to live in age-restricted
projects or communities, those who do are willing to pay a premium for the ability
to do so. The designation ‘‘Age Restricted’’ or ‘‘Seniors Only’’ may act as a signal
to assure prospective purchasers that the project’s bundle of attributes, especially
those that are important to the elderly, will continue to be available to them and
will not be diluted or lost because families or other households are prohibited
from moving into the project. This assurance is consistent with the thesis proposed
by Hughes and Turnbull (1996) that reduced uncertainty resulting from deed
restrictions could be capitalized into house prices.
Most of the variables in Model 1 were included to control for property
characteristics and other sources of variation in price beyond age-restricted status.
The signs and magnitude of these coefﬁcients are reasonable and as expected. The
coefﬁcient for time, 0.098, converts to an annual increase in house prices of
slightly over 10% for this time period. House prices were relatively low in the
early 1990s because of the recession and slow growth in the Phoenix economy.
The 10% rate of price increase through the end of 1996 is reasonable given the
more rapid growth that occurred during these years. The coefﬁcient for ‘‘All Cash’’
purchases, 0.077, reﬂects approximately a 7% discount for buyers who do not
use debt ﬁnancing. The insigniﬁcance of the ‘‘Permits’’ variable indicates that the
property characteristics and other variables adequately control for differences
between the two cities.
Model 2 has been estimated to measure the short-term response of Youngtown
prices to the loss of the age restriction and subsequent actions to resurrect it. Data
for all four cities were included when estimating Model 2 and those results are
also reported in Exhibit 6. The coefﬁcients for the Youngtown, El Mirage and Sun
City dummy variables are all statistically signiﬁcant, which suggests that there are
important differences across these cities relative to the omitted city, Peoria. The
property characteristics variables are all statistically signiﬁcant and have the
anticipated signs, much like the results for Model 1.
The Event 1 variables reﬂect house prices for the four months (October 1997–
January 1998) after the ruling that the Youngtown ordinance was invalid and
unenforceable. The coefﬁcient for Youngtown (E1YT) is negative and statistically
signiﬁcant. This is not surprising because house prices in Youngtown apparently
reﬂected a long-term age restriction premium and the loss of the age restriction,
which introduced considerable uncertainty into the Youngtown market, came as a
complete surprise. Neither the El Mirage (E1EM) nor the Sun City (E1SC)
coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant for this time period. Since the coefﬁcient for the Sun
City Event 1 variable is not signiﬁcant, there apparently was no concern that the
Youngtown opinion would impact the Sun City market. In addition to a zoning
overlay from the county, an age restriction was incorporated into the private
covenants at the time Sun City was developed.
The coefﬁcients for Events 2 and 3 (E2YT and E3YT) are both positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, in contrast to the coefﬁcients for El Mirage or Sun City,272  Guntermann and Thomas
neither of which is signiﬁcant. Event 2 was the effort to restore the age restriction
in Youngtown beginning in February 1999, while Event 3 was the period after
the proposed districts were rejected (May 1999). These results indicate that house
prices were higher in Youngtown relative to the other three cities during these two
periods in 1999, after controlling for other factors. However, the positive sign of
the coefﬁcient for Event 3 (0.102) seems inconsistent with that for Event 1
(0.068) because May–August 1999 (Event 3) is the period when the effort to
revive the age restriction ﬁnally ended. While the sign for Event 3 may be
unexpected in terms of the effort to revive the age restriction, the signs for Events
2 and 3 are consistent with the market’s adjustment to the loss of the age
restriction, which did not occur immediately.
Given the magnitude of the age restriction premium that was detected in Model
1A, it might be expected that it would take time for the premium to be eliminated.
The coefﬁcients on the Youngtown variables in Models 1B and 1C reﬂect the
adjustment process. April 2000 is one year after the end of the effort to revive an
age restriction ordinance in Youngtown. If house prices have fully adjusted to the
loss of the age restriction, the Youngtown dummy variable in Model 1 should
change from a positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient to statistically insigniﬁcant.
Model 1B was estimated with data beginning in April 2000 and continuing
through February 2003. It can be seen that the Youngtown coefﬁcient is smaller
but that it is still positive and statistically signiﬁcant compared to El Mirage. It
would appear that for at least eight months after the loss of the age restriction
(allowing for the recording lag), Youngtown prices still reﬂected at least part of
the age restriction premium. Model 1 was estimated a third time using data that
begins in October 2000, eighteen months after the rejection of the proposed
ordinance and those results are presented as Model 1C. The Youngtown coefﬁcient
is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. However, it apparently took at least one year,
and possibly closer to 18 months, for the housing market to adjust fully to the
loss of the age restriction.
The results from Model 2 for Events 2 and 3 can now be interpreted from the
perspective of the market adjustment to the loss of the age restriction. The October
1997 ruling that stripped Youngtown of its age restriction (Event 1) opened that
market to families and others who previously had been excluded from it. The
increase in sales volume in Youngtown beginning in 1999 (Exhibit 4) reﬂects this
increased accessibility. The relatively small size of houses in Youngtown made it
attractive to moderate income households, in essence putting Youngtown in
competition with the starter home market. It is likely that the positive coefﬁcients
for the two 1999 event variables reﬂect increased accessibility to the Youngtown
market rather than anything related to the age restriction.9 While the intent for
Model 2 was to test for any short-term price effects associated with the age
restriction, the two 1999 test periods occur at a time when the Youngtown housing
market was still adjusting to the loss of the age restriction. The coefﬁcients for
Events 2 and 3 probably reﬂect the adjustment to the loss of the age restriction
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The facilities and services available in Youngtown prior to the loss of the
age restriction were essentially unchanged after the age restriction became
unenforceable. Since the premium was completely eliminated within
approximately three years after the ordinance was ruled unenforceable, it would
appear that it was not just the facilities and services for the elderly that led to the
premium but the certainty that those facilities and services would be available in
the future. With the loss of the age restriction, family and other households began
to move into Youngtown. To the extent that non-elderly households would be
perceived as a negative externality in this situation, there would have been
increased uncertainty about the future availability and quality of those facilities
and services. Non-elderly households require a somewhat different mix of public
services, raising the possibility that the quality or availability of services, etc. for
the elderly could be reduced in the future. It would appear that the certainty
associated with an age restriction is capitalized into value rather than the
availability of facilities and services for the elderly.
 Conclusion
This study ﬁnds evidence of a large (18%) age restriction premium in house prices
in Youngtown Arizona compared to a comparable but non-age-restricted city.
These results are consistent with other studies in condominium and manufactured
housing markets where signiﬁcant age restriction premiums were found. The
persistence of a premium over long periods of time suggests that age-restricted
status can be a valuable component of the housing bundle, much like physical
characteristics or location. The elderly often have special needs and age
restrictions provide an assurance that the services and facilities to satisfy those
needs will be available in the future. Reduced uncertainty associated with deed
restrictions can be capitalized into house prices. One explanation for the
persistence of an age restriction premium is that the reduced uncertainty about the
future availability of important services and facilities has been capitalized into
house prices.
After the Youngtown ordinance was ruled invalid in late 1997, a negative price
effect (approximately 7%) could be detected in the data for a short period of time.
This is not surprising given the existence of an age restriction premium and
because the ruling was completely unanticipated by Youngtown residents. The
loss of Youngtown’s age restriction opened the housing market to families and
others who previously had been excluded from it, which is reﬂected in increased
sales activity after efforts failed to reinstate the restriction. Since Youngtown house
prices contained a large price premium, it took from twelve to eighteen months
for prices to adjust to the loss of the age restriction and higher prices could be
detected during this adjustment period relative to several control cities.274  Guntermann and Thomas
 Endnotes
1 U. S. Bureau of the Census. American Housing Survey for the United States: 2001, U.S.
Government Printing Ofﬁce, Washington, DC, 2002, Table 2-8.
2 Robert Schafer, Housing America’s Seniors, Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard
University, 2000, p. 1.
3 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Special Studies, P23–190, 65
in the United States. U. S. Government Printing Ofﬁce, Washington, D.C., 1996, pp 4–
24. The importance of house equity to seniors is explored more fully as it relates to age
restrictions in Mobile Homes, Affordability and the Housing for Older Persons Act of
1995, Journal of Housing for the Elderly, 2002, 16; 1–2.
4 Allen (1997) contains a more complete discussion of the various events that followed
passage of the 1988 amendment.
5 Allen, pages 339 and 345.
6 Two models were estimated using either amenity-speciﬁc variables or subdivision dummy
variables to control for differences in amenity levels and quality across subdivisions. For
the model using subdivision dummy variables, age restriction premiums ranged from
13% to 40% and averaged 22%.
7 Conciliation Agreement, Naab v. Youngtown, State of Arizona, Ofﬁce of the Attorney
General, Civil Rights Section, FHA No. 97-4016, approved April 9, 1998.
8 Similarly, the only census tracts where houses might have a signiﬁcant percentage of
swimming pools were in Peoria but much of the pool information was missing, making
it impossible to include a pool dummy variable in the hedonic model. While it is not
known what effect, if any, the lack of a pool variable may have on the results, the
coefﬁcients for the age-related event variables are likely to understate the effect of the
loss of the age restriction on price.
9 By December 1998, newspaper articles began appearing that described sharp increases
in property values in Youngtown. These articles, which appeared occasionally through
mid-2001, often focused on families moving into Youngtown and its transition to a ‘‘kid
friendly’’ community. This anecdotal evidence of change in Youngtown is consistent with
the results reported here.
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